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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
NEAL R. MORRIS, doing buiness as 
MARIAN DELIVERY SERVICE, 
and ROBERT W. WATSON, doing 
business as BOB WATSON MOV-
ING, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, HAL S. BENNETT, DON-
ALD H A C K I N G, JESSE R. S. _ . 
BUDGE, Its Commissioners; BRUCE ~~ 
TRANSFER & S T 0 R A G E CO., ' "" 
JIFFY MESSENGER SERVICE, 
HADLEY TRANSFER & STORAGE 
COMPANY, MOLLERUP MOVING 
& STORAGE COMPANY, OVER---
LAND MOVING COMPANY, and 
SUGARHOUSE VAN LINES, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' BRIEF 
E. R. CALLISTER, JR. 
Attorney General of Utah 
For Defendants, 
Public Service Commission of Utah 
Hal S. Bennett, Donald Hacking and 
Jesse R. S. Budge, Its Commissioners 
HARRY D. PUGSLEY, of 
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON 
Attorney for Defendants, 
Hadley Transfer & Storage Company 
Mollerup Moving & Storage Company 
Overland Moving Company 
Sugarhouse Van Lines 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
NEAL R. MORRIS, doing buiness as 
MARIAN DELIVERY SERVICE, 
and ROBERT W. WATSON, doing 
business as BOB WATSON MOV-
ING, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, HAL S. BENNETT, DON-
ALD H A C K I N G, JESSE R. S. 
BUDGE, Its Commissioners; BRUCE 
TRANSFER & STORAGE CO., 
JIFFY MESSENGER SERVICE, 
HADLEY TRANSFER & STORAGE 
COMPANY, MOLLERUP MOVING 
& STORAGE COMPANY, OVER-
LAND MOVING COMPANY, and 
SUGARHOUSE VAN LINES, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' BRIEF 
No 8696 
ST~TEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants answering the Brief of the appel-
lants hereby adopt generally the statement of facts 
as set forth therein, with the following additions. 
Mr. Watson testified in addition that he had 
sold his only truck (R. 139) and had cancelled his 
insurance on the motor carrier operation (R. 140). 
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Then as to the reasons for the purported reactiva-
tion of operations he testified, (R. 142) "Q. Now, 
the reason you asked for your permit to be reac-
tivated or your certificate was for the purpose of 
consummating this sale, was it not? 
In other words, you had asked the Commission 
to approve the sale of your rights to Mr. Morris. 
A. Yes. 
Q. That was the reason you asked that -
A. Yes. 
Q. - the suspension be revoked. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Otherwise you were still in a position so 
far as your health was concerned, that. you couldn't 
operate this business yourself? 
A. 'That's right. 
Q. You didn't intend to operate it yourself? 
A. No. 
Q. And you didn't reactivate these for the pur-
pose of anyone else operating it except Mr. Morris; 
isn't that correct? 
A. That's right." (R. 142) 
Further he testified that he had no record of 
the one alleged haul of an appliance that he claimed 
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to have made with Mr. Morris and stated also, (R. 
143) 
BY MR. ADAMS: 
Q. Mr. Watson, if this - if the Commission 
didn't allow Mr. Morris to assume your rights, 
vvould you ask that your certificate of convenience 
be suspended again? 
MR. WORSLEY: I object to that as imma-
terial and argumentative. 
COM. HACKING: Well, it may be helpful. 
The witness may answer. 
I suppose what the question is, Mr. Watson: 
If this application isn't granted, what will you 
do with your rights? 
A. Well, I would try to dispose of them to 
someone else. 
Q. You wouldn't attempt to carry them on 
yourself? 
A. No." (R. 143) 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THERE IS COMPETENT AND SUFFICIENT MA-
TERIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT 
THE FINDINGS AND ORDER OF THE COMMISSION. 
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POINT II 
THE ABANDONMENT OF OPERATIONS BY MR. 
WATSON SUBJECTED HIS AUTHORITY TO CAN-
CELLATION AND THE COMMISSION HAD JURIS-
DICTION TO CANCEL SUCH. 
POINT III 
APPLICANTS BOTH KNEW THAT IN THESE 
"TRANSFER" MATTERS THE COMMISSION MUST 
NECESSARILY CANCEL THE OLD AUTHORITY AS 
A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO ANY POSSIBLE IS-
SUE OF A NEW CERTIFICATE, SO THEIR ATTEND-
ANCE AT AND PARTICIPATION IN THE PROCEED-
INGS WAIVED ANY NEED FOR A SPECIAL NOTICE 
THAT THE OLD RIGHTS MIGHT BE CANCELLED. 
POINT IV 
THE ORDER DENYING THE PROPOSED TRANS-
FER OF OPERATING RIGHTS IS SUPPORTED BY 
COl\IPETENT AND ADEQUATE EVIDENCE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE IS COMPETENT AND SUFFICIENT MA-
TERIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT 
THE FINDINGS AND ORDER OF THE COMMISSION. 
POINT II 
THE ABANDONMENT OF OPERATIONS BY MR. 
WATSON SUBJECTED HIS AUTHORITY TO CAN-
CELLATION AND THE COMMISSION HAD JURIS-
DICTION TO CANCEL SUCH. 
The Public Service Commission is vested with 
numerous responsibilities and powers and must ex-
ercise such in the public good. Neither it nor the 
Legislature have permitted the sale or transfer of 
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motor carrier operating rights. The issue of public 
convenience and necessity is paramount when the 
so-called "transfer" cases come before the Commis-
sion. 
Through the procedure of cancelling the old 
authority and issuing a new certificate to the new 
operator, the Commission has effectively sanctioned 
transfers of operating authority. It has not been 
required that new proof of public convenience and 
necessity be adduced where the vendor was actively 
engaged in the transporting of commodities for hire 
in Utah. The fact of such active operations has been 
deemed by the Commission in the past as good and 
sufficient proof of a need for a continuation of the 
same service by the vendee. 
In the present case, no such active operational 
status existed. The transcript shows that prior to 
December of 1955 he stopped operations and on 
December 3rd applied to the Commission for sus-
pension of operations. He continued inactive, sold 
his truck, cancelled his insurance and performed 
no service until Mr. Morris induced him to sign a 
contract for the sale of the rights for $200.00. Then 
he was induced, by Mr. Morris's offer of purchase, · 
to apply for resumption of service. This was in 
August of 1956. 
At pages 142-143 of the record, Mr. Watson 
admitted that the only reason for requesting restor-
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a tion of his rights was to enable him to peddle them 
to Mr. Morris and that he, Mr. Watson, had no in-
tention whatsoever of personally operating or serv-
ing the public. And if this application is not granted, 
he will not operate as a carrier, but will try to sell 
to someone else. 
Based upon this and other evidence in the 
record it was found that the said Watson rights 
were "inactive" and "dead". Can anyone dispute 
that there was adequate, competent evidence in the 
record to support such a finding? The volume of 
evidence is not material on this point in an appeal. 
However, the testimony given by Mr. Watson him-
self was plain and adequate to sustain the said find-
ings of the Commission. 
On earlier proceedings of this nature your court 
has announced the rule to be that if there is any 
evidence to support the findings by the Commission, 
then your court will not interject itself to weigh 
and analyze that evidence, nor substitute its judg-
ment for that of the Commission which has seen 
and heard the witnesses. 
Two pertinent cases dealing with the scope of 
review are: Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. Co. v. 
Public Service Commission, 121 Utah 209, 240 Pac 
(2d) 493 and Ashworth Transfer Company v. Pub-
lic Service Commission, 2 Utah (2d) 23, 268 Pac 
( 2d) 990. In the first case your court said that the 
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pDwer of review is limited to whether the Commis-
sion could reasonably find as it rlid from the evi-
dence adduced. The decision then cited the statute, 
now 54-7-16, U.C.A. 1953 which states: "The find-
ings and conclusions of the Commission on questions 
of fact shall be final and not subject to review." 
In the Ashworth case your court stated: 
"On review of an order of the Public 
Service Commission of Utah granting a cer-
tificate of convenience and necessity, it is not 
required that facts found by the Commission 
be conclusively established or shown by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. The scope of re-
view is limited to an ascertainment of whether 
the Commission had before it competent evi-
dence upon which to base its decision. U.C.A. 
1953, 54-7-16; Wycoff Co., Inc. v. Public Serv-
ice Commission, Utah, 227 P. 2d 323; Uintah 
Freight Lines v. Public Service Commission, 
Utah, 229 P. 2d 675." 
The plaintiffs cannot complain as to the com-
petency of the evidence on the question of dormancy 
of Watson's rights because they were the witnesses 
from whoE1 the evidence came. Granted, that some 
statements were also made indicating a half-hearted 
effort to operate after the Morris contract of pur-
chase was made. However, the Commissioners after 
seeing the witnesses and hearing them chose to 
believe and find that: 
''The evidence in this case discloses that 
the certificate of Watson was completely in-
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active for several months. There is no evidence 
that the public suffered from any lack of 
carrier service during this period. The evi-
dence clearly shows that the sole purpose of 
reactivating the Watson certificate was for 
the purpose of selling said certificate. In his 
application for reinstatement of Certificate 
of Convenience and Necessity No. 833 filed 
with the Commission on August 14, 1956, 
Watson alleged that "As of the date hereof, 
however, your petitioner has available trucks, 
motorcycles and other equipment, together 
with trained personnel to properly and ade-
quately conduct all operations authorized un-
der said Certificate of Convenience and Ne-
cessity, is financially able to do so, and there-
fore requests the Commission that its Order 
of December 13, 1955, be set aside and an-
nulled." It is clear from the evidence that 
Watson never intended to personally operate 
his certificate of convenience and necessity 
and that the arrangement for equipment and 
financing as above set forth was with Morris 
as the prospective purchaser of Certificate of 
Convenience and Necessity No. 833. 
"4. We are of the view that the rules of 
this Commission as above set forth with re-
spect to the transferring of an authorized 
operation of a retiring carrier to a new carrier 
are proper, reasonable and legal. We do not 
believe, however, that the laws of the State 
of Utah contemplate that an inactive certifi-
cate and a service once dead should be resur-
rected merely for the purpose of selling the 
certificate. Such procedure, if approved by 
this Commission, would in our opinion be en-
tirely repugnant to the provisions of the Motor 
Carrier Act.'' (R. 22) 
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POINT III 
APPLICANTS BOTH KNEW THAT IN THESE 
"TRANSFER" MATTERS THE COMMISSION MUST 
NECESSARILY CANCEL THE OLD AUTHORITY AS 
A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO ANY POSSIBLE IS-
SUE OF A NEW CERTIFICATE, SO THEIR ATTEND-
ANCE AT AND PARTICIPATION IN THE PROCEED-
INGS WAIVED ANY NEED FOR A SPECIAL NOTICE 
THAT THE OLD RIGHTS MIGHT BE CANCELLED. 
The application as presented (R. 1) was clear-
ly a request that Morris "assume the operating 
rights" of Watson or as stated in the body, "perform 
the same operating authority" as evidenced by the 
Watson certificate. The notice of hearing set out 
similar phrases and both Mr. Morris and Mr. Wat-
son were present at the hearing. Both were repre-
sented by competent legal counsel. 
Each party to the matter was an experienced 
motor carrier, presumably aware of the statutes re-
lating to "transfers" of rights. It is common knowl-
edge that the "transfer" involves a cancellation of 
the vendor's rights and a request for a new certifi-
cate in the name of the vendee. 
The Rules of Practice and Procedure published 
by the Commission Sept. 6, 1939, Section 21.3 pro-
vides: 
"Section 21.3 TRANSFER OF OPER-
ATING RIGHTS: The Commission will not 
permit the transfer or assignment of operat-
ing rights granted by it. Any bona fide pur-
chaser of an option on the operating rights of 
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any person under the jurisdiction of the Com-
mission may make application to the Commis-
sion for a grant of such rights. The granting 
of such rights will be discretionary with the 
Commission.'' 
In the face of this, the parties applied to the 
Commission and submitted their positions to its 
jurisdiction for action. Perhaps the calculated risk 
of having the Watson rights cancelled out was well 
known as the consideration for the rights was only 
$200.00. Had the operating authority been active 
and had Mr. Watson preserved his rights, the same 
would have had a much greater value. 
No separate proceeding is requisite to due pro-
cess of law when the only two affected parties to the 
contract, Watson and Morris are personally before 
the Commission and represented by counsel. We are 
at a loss to know what different testimony would 
have been given by Mr. Watson had a different type 
notice been sent to him. He and counsel well knew 
that the first issue was the cancellation of his 
authority. They both knew of the dormancy thereof. 
In the Provo Transfer & Storage Co. v. Public 
Service Commission case, 3 Utah ( 2d) 86, 287 Pac. 
(2d) 985 your court confirmed the right of the Com-
mission to cancel and revoke a carriers operating 
authority in connection with a proposed transfer 
through an acquisition of stock. This decision reads 
in part: 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"Petitioner argues that Sec. 54-6-20 
should be construed as a narrow grant of dis-
cretionary power to the Commission as other-
wise "no security of operation could be had by 
any motor carrier, and each would be subject 
to the whim of the succeeding members of the 
Public Service Commission." It is further 
asserted that "an administrative body such as 
the Public Service Commission cannot be a 
law unto itself in all things and arbitrarily 
take f1'0m the carrier its certificate, as a 
public utility has a substantial interest in the 
operation and should not without due process 
of law be deprived of its valuable property 
right without just and substantial cause be-
ing shown." C01nplaint is made that no stan-
dards were established by the Legislature as 
a guide to the Commission in the revocation 
or suspension of operating authority and it is 
asserted that the remedy in this case should be 
the initiation of the criminal proceeding con-
templated by 54-6-18, U.C.A., 1953. No pre-
cedent is submitted in support of this argu-
ment. 
"We do not sit in these certiorari pro-
ceedings to determine whether the action tak-
en by the Commission is exactly to our liking. 
Suffice it to say that it appears that the Le-
gislature has vested in this administrative tri-
bunal plenary powers to revoke and suspend 
certificates of convenience, for good cause, 
and where it appears, as in the present case, 
that one motor carrier, in violation of the 
statute, purchased stock in another motor 
carrier and then proceeded to take over and 
operate the freight department of the cor-
poration bought into without the consent of 
the Commission, we are not prepared to hold 
11 
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that good cause for the revocation of the 
carrier's certificate has not been shown." 
Upon that precedent alone, it is fair to assume 
that the Court will affirm the decision of the Com-
mission in the instant case. Due process of law has 
been met by the personal appearances of Mr. Wat-
son and Mr. Morris, their free and unhampered 
testimony and their representation by counsel before 
the Commission. 
POINT IV 
THE ORDER DENYING THE PROPOSED TRANS-
FER OF OPERATING RIGHTS IS SUPPORTED BY 
COMPETENT AND ADEQUATE EVIDENCE. 
The need for findings on the financial ability, 
experience and fitness of applicant, Morris, pre-
supposes an absolute right of transfer of the operat-
ing rights from Watson to Morris. No findings as 
to fitness were required as the Commission found 
that it was not in the public interest to continue the 
dormant operations. 
It is entirely consistent for the Commission to 
block this transaction as it has long taken a position 
that the best interests of the public are the first 
consideration. Trafficing in certificates has never 
been approved by it. The bargain between these two 
parties was squarely in the face of the Commission's 
rule quoted above which states that the Commission 
will not permit a transfer. 
12 
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How has Mr. Morris been prejudiced by the ab-
sence of a specific finding as to his fitness to oper-
ate? Had he been the largest and most affluent car-
rier in the United States, still in this instance no 
prejudice would result on the failure of the com-
mission to recite his fitness. If no rights were to be 
issued to him (because of the dormancy and inac-
tivity of the vendor) no further findings were ma-
terial. 
Defendants submit that the Report and Order 
of the Commission should be sustained by the Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, JR. 
Attorney General of Utah 
For Defendants, 
Public Service Commission of Utah 
Hal S. Bennett, Donald Hacking and 
JesseR. S. Budge, Its Commissioners 
HARRY D. PUGSLEY, of 
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON 
Attorney for Defendants, 
Hadley Transfer & Storage Company 
Mollerup Moving & Storage Company 
Overland Moving Company 
Sugarhouse Van Lines 
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